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Abstract: The EU »economic constitution« systematically biases EU policy making in a neo-
liberal direction.  Historically speaking, this was not the intent of the EU founding fathers.  
The original constitutional settlement of embedded liberalism was significantly redefined in 
the next major revisions of the Rome Treaty.  The neo-liberal foundations of the single market 
and the EMU have imposed real and significant institutional constraints for progressive policy 
making. However, the role of the European Left was crucial in this alteration of the EU 
constitutional order. Despite the strong neoliberal consensus among the key political actors of 
that time, such a change would have not be possible without the Left' retreat towards »centre-
leftism«, particularly in France.  Furthermore, while constrains of the EU economic 
constitution are significant, we should avoid the »naturalization« of the EU project. The 
European Left, while in power, failed to leave its distinct imprint on the EU economic 
constitution. The Left policy agenda remained firmly embedded in the logic of the nation 
state.  The euro crisis pushed these developments even further and, for the first time in the EU 
history, explicitly challenged the constitutional balance of the EU legal order.  The new 
Austerity Union, a project in the making, profoundly altered this constitutional balance.       
 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 
At the moment, only five out of twenty seven member states of the European Union (EU) are 
governed by left parties or left dominated coalitions.1 On the EU level, the Left fares even 
worse. The last European elections in 2009 brought the Left the worst defeat since the first 
elections to the European parliament in 1979.  The European Council and the European 
Parliament, two legislative bodies of the European Union (EU), are firmly in the hands of 
centre-right political parties, and equally is the European Commission, the executive body of 
the EU.     
 
Paradoxically, the European Left is on the wane precisely when the 'objective conditions' of 
the world economy seem to work for the Left. When the worst economic crisis of capitalism 
since the Great Depression hit Europe, many expected a strong comeback of the European 
Left. The economic crisis, ultimately the end result of neoliberal deregulatory ideology and 
policies, was rightly perceived as a great window of opportunity for the Left, which could not 
have been blamed for the disastrous consequences of neoliberal economic and political 
                                                 
 Professor of Law, Faculty of Law, University of Ljubljana. 
1 The Guardian, Left, right, left how political shifts have altered the map of Europe, available at:  
http:www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2011/jul/28/Europe-politics-interactive-map-left-right? 
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policies of the centre-right parties in power. Not only economic conditions but also favourable 
modernizing demographic trends are shifting the political terrain in favour of the Left.  The 
rise of a progressive younger generation, the increase in immigrant population, the growth of 
the professional class and the increasing social weight of single and alternative households 
and growing religious diversity and secularism, combined with the Left traditional base 
among the working class, makes them 'the natural beneficiaries of modernity'.2      
 
Yet, despite these favourable socioeconomic conditions, the European Left has failed to 
persuade the voters. The European Left not only suffered some of the worst electoral defeats 
in the recent history, it also does not seem to possess a convincing political program offering a 
credible alternative to the centrist pragmatism of European centre-right parties. As the EU is 
facing its most serious institutional and political crisis since its inception, the European Left is 
notably absent from public debate on how to solve the Eurozone debt crisis. Politically 
weakened, the European Left is on defensive and instead of offering solutions, it reacts to the 
new politics of fiscal austerity and balanced budget fundamentalism of the centre-right 
parties.   
 
Since the start of the euro-zone crisis in 2010, governments across the continent have 
responded by imposing fiscal austerity.  The new politics of fiscal austerity do not mean only 
double digit cuts of governments' spending but also the elevation of the austerity paradigm of 
the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the status of 'unbreakable law'. The new Fiscal 
compact, an intergovernmental treaty signed by all EU members but the UK and the Czech 
Republic, basically outlaws Keynesianism and its counter-cyclical economic policies and 
constitutionalizes austerity and balanced budgets as new fundamental principles of the EU 
constitutional order. As Newman sarcastically argues, such developments should make Tea 
Party loyalists in the United States green with envy.3  He elaborates that the politics of fiscal 
austerity will transform Europe's political economy in the long term, strengthening the 
neoliberal ideas of limited government and loosely regulated markets while simultaneously 
precluding any alternative social-democratic framework.   
 
What these new developments offer is a new perspective on the political economy of the EU 
integration. If only four decades ago it was still possible to ask whether the Left should be 
against Europe4, today the question has to be reframed: is Europe, its politico-legal 
framework, working against the Left? Is the European Left confronted with a distinct 
constitutional order, which, because of its pro-market neoliberal bias, radically limits the 
ability of the Left to pursue its political programme? As Perry Anderson reminds us, it was 
Friedrich von Hayek who basically foresaw a development of a constitutional structure of an 
inter-state federation which would structurally limit the ability of electorates to enact dirigiste 
                                                 
2 M.Browne, J.Halpin, R.Teixeira, 'The European Paradox', Center for American Progress, September 
2009, 1. 
3 A.Newman, 'Austerity and the End of the European Model: How Neoliberals Captured the 
Continent', May 1, 2012, available at  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/137611/abraham-
newman/austerity-and-the-end-of-the-european-model 
4 T.Nairn, 'The Left Against Europe?', (1972)  I/75 New Left Review 5-120. 
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and redistributive policies.5 The major obstacle that such interstate federation would erect 
against pursuing redistributive polices is the lack of international solidarity required to sustain 
such policies.6 When compared with the most recent political developments in the EU, 
Hayek's words from 1939 look like a prophecy.     
 
During the last two decades the EU evolved into a new kind of political order making it 
difficult to pursue a genuine Left political agenda. Namely, the EU entered a new phase of 
integration which has radically transformed the EU capacity to combine liberalism of 
common economic market with redistributive social policies either on the national or the EU 
level. As Höpner and Schäfer argue, the EU has come closer to Hayeks' neoliberal vision of 
inter-state federation than to the socially embedded liberal economic regime as envisaged by 
its founding fathers.7  Their vision, codified in the first EU Treaty in 1957, was somehow 
different. As most convincingly shown by historian Milward, the original constitutional 
settlement represented a compromise between international free trade and domestic state 
interventionism, a European version of what has later to become known as 'embedded 
liberalism'.8  
 
Nowadays, important economists, political scientists and lawyers write about a 'political 
trilemma'  of the EU making it difficult9 if not structurally impossible10 to combine common 
economic market and redistributive social policies on the EU level. In its most extreme form, 
the argument about the neoliberal bias of European constitutional order postulates that it is 
structurally impossible to develop an EU version of social market economy. Fritz Scharpf, 
one of leading scholars of European integration, argues that  
 
the socio-economic asymmetry of European law is caused by structural conditions 
whose effect does not depend on the ideological orientations of members of the Court or 
the Commission. For this same reason, it can hardly be corrected through changes in the 
party-political composition of the Council or through elections to the European 
Parliament.11   
 
According to this theory, the law, in the form of the European constitution, determines the 
politics of the European Union. The European Constitution, a legal superstructure, has, so to 
speak, a life of its own and crucially determines the base, the relations of production.  In other 
                                                 
5 P.Anderson, The New Old World  ( Verso, 2010), at 64-65. 
6 F.A.Hayek, 'The Economic Conditions of Interstate Federalism', in F.A. Hayek, Individualism and 
Economic Order ( Routledge &Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), at 266.  
7 M.Höpner, A.Schäfer, 'Embeddedness and Regional Integration: Waiting for Polanyi in a Hayekian 
Setting', (2012) 66 International Organization 429.  
8 J.G. Ruggie, 'International Regimes, transactions, and change: embedded liberalism in the postwar 
economic order', (1982) 36 International Organization 392. 
9 D.Rodrik, The Globalization Paradox: Democracy and the Future of the World Economy ( W.W. 
Norton &Company, 2011), at 220;  K.H. O’Rourke,  'A Tale of Two Trilemmas', March 2011, 
Department of Economics and IIIS, Trinity College Dublin, 3. 
10 F.W.Scharpf, 'The asymmetry of European integration, or why the EU cannot be a “social market 
economy”', (2010) 8 Socio-Economic Review 243. 
11 ibid, 243. 
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words, the European Left is confronted with a distinct EU constitutional order, which, 
because of its neoliberal bias, radically limits the importance of the Left's political agenda.  
 
While in broad terms sympathetic to this powerful theory, this article offers an alternative 
explanation for the fundamental asymmetry between the neo-liberal and social agenda in the 
EU legal order. The crucial reason for the absence of more developed 'social Europe' is not 
only the structure of the EU constitutional order as such but also the reluctance and inability 
of the Left to 'Europeanize' its social agenda.12 The Left thinking and policy proposals 
concerning 'social Europe' have remained firmly embedded in the logic of the nation state. 
The Left urgently needs a new post-national approach to 'social Europe'.   
 
In the first four sections of the article I chronicle four different episodes of the institutional 
settlement between the market and the social in the EU legal order. In the last section I 
discuss policy alternatives to the current austerity approach to the euro crisis.  
 
 
II. The European Rescue of the Nation State   
 
The relationship between the European Left and European integration was always a complex 
one. The European Economic Community (EEC), from its inception, was not a Left project. 
George Ross argues that the real movers of European integration were Centre-Right Christian 
Democrats, who were haunted by World War II.13 The European Left of that era was more 
focused on national systems of economic and political development and was not very 
enthusiastic about European integration. However, with the exception of the two largest 
Communist parties (PCF and PCI), other socialist or social-democratic parties in principle did 
not oppose the project of European integration.14 As mostly opposition parties, they did not 
leave their imprint on the construction of an integrated Europe. Their primary concern was to 
keep the welfare state and its redistributive policies firmly within the jurisdiction of the nation 
state.   
 
A constitutional compromise reached during the negotiations leading to the Treaties of Rome 
was to decouple economic integration from social protection issues.15 Whereas the first was 
constitutionalised in the 'economic constitution', 'the social' was put on a separate track and 
                                                 
12 G.Moschonas, 'When institutions matter: the EU and the identity of social democracy', (2009) 17/2 
Renewal 13. 
13 G.Ross, 'European Center-Lefts and the Mazes of European Integration', in J. Cronin, G.Ross, 
J.Shoch (eds), What’s Left of the Left: Democrats and Social Democrats in Challenging Times, (Duke 
University Press, 2011), at 321. 
14 D.Sassoon, One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century   
(The New Press, 1996), at 229. 
15 F.W.Scharpf, 'The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity', (2002) 40 
Journal of Common Market Studies 646. 
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remained mostly national.16 This fact is often overlooked by those accounts which argue that 
the Treaties of Rome represented an overwhelming victory of neo-liberalism over the French 
attempt to institutionalize a more regulated Europe.17 In reality, both Christian Democrats and 
Social Democrats were, although for different reasons, strong supporters of the welfare state. 
Hence, both camps have their own reasons not to transfer social policy to the European 
level.18   
 
The Treaties of Rome thus represented a compromise between two different visions of 
European integration. On the one hand we find German ordoliberals, strongly represented in 
the German delegation, strongly favouring economic freedoms as the key instrument of 
integration, while on the other hand both Christian Democrats and Social Democrats 
embraced the vision of regulated capitalism at home combined with open trade on the 
European level, or the 'Smith abroad, Keynes at home' compromise. Such a constitutional 
compromise can also be explained by the fact the Treaties of Rome were signed in a particular 
socioeconomic context, i.e., during the golden age of the Keynesian welfare state.  As a 
consequence, the constitutional settlement codified in the Treaties of Rome can be best 
described as a model of embedded liberalism, which tried to accommodate open markets 
aimed at securing economic growth with domestic political intervention protecting 'societies 
from capitalism's destructive and destabilizing tendencies'.19  The first European constitution 
therefore consisted of rules written in the Treaties themselves and implicit rules excluding 
majority of social issues from the ambit of the EEC jurisdiction.20 
 
As the EEC during the first two decades did not evolve into more than a customs union, the 
national systems of social protection could expand rapidly. As a consequence, the European 
»economic constitution« could coexist easily with nationally based systems of social 
protection and development. While member states could gain from the advantages of the 
»common market«, at the same time, they were able to continue with the post-war state led 
development of national welfare states. As argued by Milward, the aim of European 
integration was to 'rescue the nation state': 
 
The problem genuinely was how to construct a commercial framework which would not 
endanger the levels of social welfare which had been reached...The Treaties of Rome 
had to be also an external buttress to the welfare state. 21 
                                                 
16 C.Joerges, 'Rechstaat and Social Europe: How a Classical Tension Resurfaces in the European 
Integration Process', (2010) 9 Comparative Sociology 70; A.S. Milward,  The European Rescue of the 
Nation State, 2nd edition (Routledge, 2000), at 216. 
17 M.A.Pollack, 2000. 'A Blairite Treaty: Neo-Liberalism and Regulated Capitalism in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam', in K.Neunreither, A.Wiener (eds), European Integration After Amsterdam: Institutional 
Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2000), at 271-272. 
18 P.Manow, A.Schäfer, H. Zorn, 'European Social Policy and Europe’s Party-Political Center of 
Gravity, 1957-2003', MPlfG Discussion Paper, 2004/6, 19; A.J.Menendez, A, 'The Existential Crisis 
of the European Union', (2013) German Law Journal, Forthcoming. 
19 S.Berman,  'European Disintegration? Warnings from History', (2012) 23 Journal of Democracy 7.  
20 S.Giubboni, Social Rights and Market Freedom in the European Constitution (Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), at 16. 
21 Milward, n 16 supra, 216. 
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As long as this was possible, the Left did not have strong incentives to challenge the project 
of European integration.  Rather, the Left 'remained by and large a passive bystander, 
occasionally voicing criticism yet without challenging the project at its core'.22 In other words, 
even though the Treaties of Rome bore the strong imprint of economic liberalism, such 
framework was perfectly compatible, both for the Left and the Centre-Right, with nationally 
based welfare states.  
 
However, the turning point came in the 1980s. After the turbulent decade of stagnation and 
'eurosclerosis', European integration gained a new momentum with the adoption of the Single 
European Act (SEA) in 1986 and the Maastricht Treaty (TEU) in 1992. As argued by 
Moravcsik, both revisions of the original Treaty were the consequence of a broad political 
convergence among the key member states (Germany, France and Britain) towards the 
neoliberal goal of creating a single European market .23  The relaunching of European 
integration thus coincided with a major shift in the political ideology. The golden age of the 
Keynesian welfare state did come to an end and gave its way to a new powerful ideology - 
pro-market neoliberalism.     
 
 
III. From embedded liberalism to embedded neoliberalism? 
 
 
 With both revisions of the original Rome Treaty, the European Union moved decisively into 
an economic and a monetary union. The SEA was followed by a massive program of EC 
legislation aimed at removing all non-tariff barriers to a »single market« consisting of free 
movement of goods, services, capital and people. By the target date of the completion of the 
single market, the end of 1992, 260 out of 279 measures listed in the White Paper had been 
adopted in the Council of Ministers, what represented 'a staggering 95 per cent success rate'.24  
It goes without saying that such a result would not be possible without a major institutional 
innovation adopted in the SEA which introduced qualified majority voting for single-market 
measures. However, equally important was the neoliberal consensus among Thatcher, Kohl 
and Mitterand on the importance of the single market promising Europe economies of scale 
needed to compete with rival economies of the US and Japan (Moravcsik, 1991, 42).25 As 
both Moravcsik and Pollack argue, the SEA was 'a quintessentially neoliberal project' .26 At 
that time, centre-right parties enjoyed a strong majority across Europe.  
                                                 
22 O. Cramme, 'The power of European integration: Social democracy in search for purpose', Policy 
Network Paper 2011, 5. 
23 A. Moravcsik, The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose& State Power from Messina to Maastricht  
(Cornell University Press, 1998), at 317. 
24 I. Bache, S. George, S. Bulmer, Politics in the European Integration, 3rd Edition (Oxford University 
Press.2011), at 159. 
25 A. Moravcsik,  'Negotiating the Single European Act', in R.O.Keohane, S.Hoffmann  (eds), The New 
European Community: Decisionmaking and Institutional Change  (Westwiev Press,1991), at 42. 
26 Moravcsik, ibid,42; Pollack, note 17 supra, 273.  
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However, France, one of the key member states, was at that time strongly in Socialist hands. 
According to Ross, it was Mitterand's turn from failed domestic Keynesian policies to Europe 
which crucially contributed to the success of the single market project. Even though European 
integration did not begin as a left affair, it had been relaunched in the 1980s by an interesting 
coalition of Kohl, Mitterand and Delors, where the two French socialist politicians played the 
leading role.27  With the single market program and monetary integration, both deeply liberal 
economic initiatives, at the heart of the relaunch, this new intiative helped to convert Europe 
to post-Keynesian outlook.  Hence, it was French Socialist's transformation from traditional 
post World War II Keynesian leftism to centre-leftism build around the new single market 
initiative which paradoxically made centre-leftism obligatory for other European Left 
parties.28  Since the SEA represented 'a massive advance' in the opening of the European 
markets29, the EC member states' autonomy in welfare issues was no longer secure. As the 
single market became almost a goal in itself, it was possible to argue that many social policy 
objectives represent non-tariff barriers to trade and as such violate the 'logic' of the single 
market. Consequently, during the next two decades, the EU was able vastly to expand the 
scope of the single market at the expense of the autonomy of member states to pursue 
autonomous welfare policies. 
 
According to Scharpf, the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) role in this process is usually 
neglected by the literature explaining the success of these reforms.30 ECJ's early case law 
paved the way for a future reconfiguration of the original balance between the economic 
freedoms and social rights in the EU legal order.  Scharpf argues that ECJ rulings in two early 
cases, Dassonvile (1974)31 and Cassis (1979)32, crucially limited member states' discretion in 
formulating national policies and announced a new rule of mutual recognition33 which has 
»changed the bargaining constellation and incentives that member states faces in the 
processes of European legislation. While in the past national law had remained in force as 
long as governments did not agree on a harmonization directive, the new default condition 
would be mutual recognition«.34 The paradox is that once the Court of Justice had established 
basic principles interpreting market freedoms in its own  particular way, political bodies of the 
EU, with their veto position being undermined, had little choice but to follow the court's case 
law. Subsequently, the ECJ had extended the reach of its early rulings from free trade to free 
                                                 
27 Ross, note 13 supra, 323. 
28 ibid, 324. 
29 M. Gilbert, European integration, A Concise History (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers , Inc., 
2012), at 139. 
30 Scharpf, note 10 supra, 225. 
31 Dassonvile, C-8/74, 11.07.1974. 
32 Cassis, C-120/78, 20.2.1979. 
33 The principle was only encapsulated  in the Cassis ruling, but later explicitely formulated in the 
Commission's communication: Any product lawfully produced and marketed in one Member state 
must, in principle, be admitted to the market of any other Member State. See P.Craig,G. de Burca  EU 
Law: Text, Cases and Materials, 5th edition (Oxford University Press, 2011), at 649; K. Alter,  The 
European’s Court Political Power. Selected Essays (Oxford University Press, 2009), at 142, 143.  
34 Scharpf, note 13 supra, 224. 
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services delivery, free establishment, free capital movement and the free mobility of workers. 
This led, according to Scharpf, to a highly asymmetric institutional development: legal 
integration (integration through law), developed by an ever increasing case law of the ECJ, 
outpaced political integration impeded by heterogeneous interests of the member states.35 Due 
to the 'peculiar understanding' of economic freedoms by the ECJ, where the priority is 
assigned to the rights of capital holders over the socio-economic rights36 (Menendez, 2012, 
70), the first asymmetry has also had a strong effect on the substantive direction of subsequent 
European legislation.37      
 
Unlike in the national constitutional setting, where national courts have to balance the 
importance of economic and social dimensions, treating them as having an equal 
constitutional status, in ECJ jurisprudence the social clearly remained subordinate to the 
economic.38 Although with time and new amendments to the original Rome Treaty the line 
between the economic and the social has become blurred, it is important to emphasize that the 
social never achieved a constitutional parity with the economic. ECJ's judicial interpretation 
of market freedoms relies on various theoretical assumptions about the role of markets, 
governments and social policy in a market economy. The crucial flaw of the Court's doctrine 
lies in its orthodox subscription to a 'pre-realist' understanding of the market economy.  One 
of the key insights of American legal realists, later developed by a progressive left wing 
school of thought, Critical legal studies, was that markets are not pre-political structures with 
a single natural form but a product of public/political regulation.39 One important implication 
of this claim is that there are many different forms that market economy can assume. When 
the ECJ decides issues which involve balancing of conflicting interests protected by market 
freedoms on one hand and social rights on the other, it usually relies on a concept of internal 
market which strongly resembles the concept of a market criticized by American legal 
realists. Here, the market or internal market is constructed as a non-political structure which 
exists in a certain 'natural' form where public regulation (in the form of social rights) only ex 
post facto changes the character of such a 'natural entity'. The Court's jurisprudence on 
internal market created a concept of market which became almost a goal in itself: 
 
The European Court of Justice is neoformalist in its interpretation of the canonical 
freedoms of movement of goods and persons in a »single market« in part, as is widely 
recognized, in order to drape its legislative power in the cloak of legal necessity.40  
                                                 
35 As Gilbert argues, while Cassis judgment provided an important stimuls for reform, we should not 
overestimate  the extent to which the ruling opened the trade barriers within the EC. See Gilbert, note 
29 supra, 131.  
36 A.J. Menendez, 'A proportionate constitution? Economic Freedoms, substantive constitiutional 
choices and dérapages in European Union Law', in E. Chiti, A.J. Menendez , P.G. Teixera (eds),  The 
European Rescue of the European Union? The existential crisis of the European political project, 
ARENA Report No. 3/12, RECON Report no. 19, at 70.  
37 Scharpf, note 13 supra, 225.  
38 Menendez, note 34 supra, 106. 
39 J.W. Singer, 'Review Essay: Legal Realism Now', (1988) 76 California Law Review 477. 
40 D.Kennedy, 'Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850-2000', in D.M.Trubek, 
A.Santos (eds), The New Law and Economic Development: A Critical Appraisal ( Cambridge 
University Press, 2006) at 69. 
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As a consequence, the 'economic constitution' was constructed as non-political text juridified 
through supranational law, whereas social policy was conceptualized as 'a categorically 
distinct subject. It belonged to the domain of political legislation, and, as such, had to remain 
national'.41  Such depoliticization of EU constitutional law has had far reaching consequences 
for a future development of 'the social' in the EU constitutional legal order. The expulsion of 
the social from the constitutional level has paved the way for a particular juristic 
interpretation of the European constitution. According to Scharpf, it contributed to the 
fundamental asymmetry between market liberalization (negative integration) and social 
protection (positive integration) being now locked in the EU constitutional legal order. While 
the negative integration could be achieved quite easily, the positive integration was impeded 
by a 'joint decision trap' preventing governments to agree on common EU regulatory 
standards in crucial social policy areas. Hence, the reconfiguration of the original balance 
between the economic freedoms and social rights has been crucially shaped by the 'peculiar' 
judicial interpretation of core constitutional provisions (four freedoms) of the EC Treaty.42   
 
For Delors, the single market programme was only the first step in a more ambitious 
programme of integration.  He strongly believed that the economic liberalization programme 
would be followed by both monetary union and creation of 'social Europe'.43  While he was 
very successful in promoting common currency, his 'social Europe' idea was a gamble (Ross, 
2011).44   
 
In unique historical circumstances, marked by the 'acceleration of history' ( the collapse of 
Communism, the end of the Cold War and German re-unification), and with a support of the 
key member states, The Treaty on European Union (the Maastricht Treaty)  was signed in 
February 1992. Monetary union was by far the most important single policy initiative in the 
Maastricht Treaty.  Premised on the neo-liberal foundations, EMU substantially constrained 
the ability of member states to pursue fiscal and economic policies substantially different 
from the prevailing ordoliberal45 orthodoxy of sound finance doctrine which found its place in 
the new Treaty provisions. EMU was embedded in a highly restrictive macroeconomic policy 
regime which was pre-Keynesian in its nature (Arestis, Sawyer, 2006; 6).46 Its key ingredients 
included the most independent central bank in the world (ECB) with the overarching 
                                                 
41 Joerges, note 16 supra, 70.  
42 Barnard criticizes such 'market access' approach and argues for adoption of 'discrimination-based' 
approach, modeled upon the US Supreme Court jurisprudence to the Commerce Clause. See 
C.Barnard, 'Restricting Restrictions: Lessons for the EU from the US?', (2009) 68 Cambridge Law 
Journal 577. 
43 Bache, George, Bulmer, note 24 supra, 166. 
44 Ross, note 13 supra, 326 
45 Ordoliberalism is a German version of neo-liberalism developed in the 1930s by the Freiburg 
School. See H.Rieter, M. Schmolz, 'The ideas of German Ordoliberalism 1938-45: pointing the way to 
a new economic order', (1993) 1 The European Journal of History of Economic Thought  87-114. 
46 P.Arestis, M. Sawyer, 'Macroeconomic policy and the European Constitution', in P.Arestis, 
M.Sawyer (eds), Alternative Perspectives on Economic Policies in the European Union  (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2006) at 6. 
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emphasis on price stability and with an absolute priority of monetary policy which is taken as 
the main instrument of macroeconomic policy. Fiscal policy, on the other hand, was severely 
constrained by the rigid rules of the Stability and Growth Pact prohibiting member states from 
running excessive budget deficits and excessive general government debt. As explained by 
McNamara, the adoption of EMU followed a new neoliberal policy consensus which 
'emphasizes the inherent stability and adaptability of the private sector and view traditional 
Keynesian efforts to manipulate the economy, particularly full employment strategies, as 
ineffective and possibly counterproductive'.47   
 
With ten out of twelve member states having conservative centre-right prime ministers, the 
broader neoliberal policy consensus about sound money doctrine and with a strong support of 
business, Delors was able to push the EMU forward.  However, his 'social Europe' agenda 
was confronted with a strong neoliberal-nationalist coalition unwilling to follow Delors's 
proposal.  Without the support of real political allies and 'swimming against the current of the 
neoliberal Zeitgeist', the Delors Commission counted on the neo-functionalist logic of market 
integration to necessitate Polanyi’s counter-movement leading to 'market correcting' 
Community institutions and policies.48 But, as it turned out, such neo-functionalist logic did 
not work as Delors wanted. As Streck has shown, a British led coalition between neoliberal 
advocates and other member states resisting harmonization easily defeated Delor’s initiative.49    
 
In other words, the original constitutional settlement was importantly redefined. The 
economic and the social, originally two parallel tracks, now started to collide. First, social 
protection policies at the national level had to be designed in the shadow of 
'constitutionalized' economic law of the single market. Second, with the creation of the 
European and Monetary Union (EMU), member states not only lost its autonomous monetary 
policy but also agreed, through SGP, to important restrictions on their fiscal policies. Third,  
the EU accumulated substantial new jurisdictions in various social policy fields such as 
employment discrimination, equal pay, health and safety at work etc.  All these developments 
led to the creation of 'semi -sovereign welfare states' in a multitiered system of social policy, 
where member states have lost more autonomy in social protection policies than the EU has 
gained in transferred new social protection authority.50  
 
                                                 
47 K. McNamara, The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union (Cornell 
University Press, 1998), at 145.  
48 W. Streeck, 'From Market Making to State Building? Reflections on the Political Economy of 
European Social Policy', in in S.Liebfried, P.Pierson (eds), European Social Policy: Between 
Fragmentation and Integration  (The Brookings Institution, 1995), at 402. 
49 W.Streeck, 'Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?', in G.Marks, F.W.Scharpf, 
P.Schmitter, W.Streeck (eds), Governance in the European Union, London (Sage Publications, 1996), 
at 75. 
50 S. Liebfried, P.Pierson, 'Semisovereign Welfare States: Social Policy in a Multitiered Europe', in 
S.Liebfried, P.Pierson (eds), European Social Policy: Between Fragmentation and Integration (The 
Brookings Institution, 1995), at 44.  
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Nevertheless, the new EU constitutional settlement after the SEA and Maastricht Treaty 
differs from the orthodox Anglo-Saxon neoliberalism. According to van Apeldoorn51, it 
represents a continental European-style neoliberalism which combines supranational 
marketization on the EU level with social elements on the national level, the latter being 
gradually hollowed out by the former. From a constitutional law perspective, it is important to 
emphasize that although the new embedded neoliberalism seriously challenges the 
constitutional balance between open market and social protection, it does not explicitly rule 
out progressive social policies. As we will see later, on this issue the Rubicon has been 
crossed with the EU response to the euro crisis.     
 
 
IV. Divided EU Left and European Integration   
 
The EU thus entered the next stage of integration with significantly altered original 
constitutional settlement. If under the Rome Treaty the social was constitutionally protected 
from the economic, after the SEA and the Maastricht Treaty it had to confront the expansive 
logic of the internal market and the constraining logic of the EMU. Bolstered with the activist 
jurisprudence of the Court of Justice, the economic constitution gradually started to encroach 
upon the social, making the latter derivative of and subordinated to the former.  The original 
balance between the economic and the social was changed so as to undermine the initial parity 
between the two.  The Left was suddenly confronted with a new kind of constitutional order 
which clearly favoured the economic constitution of the internal market over social 
protection.      
 
As the original constitutional compromise begun to unravel so did the consensus among the 
Left and Centre-Right about the aims of the internal market. Between mid-1980s and mid- 
1990s there was a broad consensus among the Left and the Right concerning the importance 
of the single  market.  However, as the policy agenda shifted from creating the single market 
to the question of how regulated or liberalized the single market should be, the polarization 
along the Left-Right political axis has increased.52 The period of 'permissive consensus' when 
European insulated elites could cut deals without a broader participation of European 
citizenry was then over.53 In these new circumstances, the volume of legislative acts adopted 
by the EU dramatically declined due to radically different positions between the European 
Left and Centre-Right on the substance of proposed legislation.54   
 
                                                 
51 B. van Apeldoorn, 'The Contradictions of “Emedded Neoliberalism” and Europe’s Multi-level 
Legitimacy Crisis: The European Project and its Limits', in B.van Apeldoorn, J. Drahokoupil, L. Horn 
(eds), Contradictions and Limits of Neo-Liberal European Governance: From Lisbon to Lisbon 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), at 24.  
 
52 S. Hix, What’s Wrong with the European Union & How to Fix It (Polity Press, 2008), at 32. 
53 L.Hooghe, G.Marks,  'A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to  Constraining Dissensus', (2008) 39 British Journal of Political Science 5. 
54 Hix, note 50 supra, 46. 
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For example, when the Centre-Right Commission led by Barroso proposed a new Services 
Directive (2006)55 aimed at introducing the country of origin principle for services, the 
attempt of liberalization of services came under a joint attack from the French and German 
governments and many left-wing MEPs, who opposed the Directive on the grounds that it 
would undermine the high social standards that apply to most services in many member states. 
Opposing the Services Directive, the Left organized one of the first and largest 
demonstrations in the front of the European Parliament which helped to defeat the original 
'neoliberal' text of the Directive aiming at full liberalization of services in the EU. After the 
ECJ issued a series of judgments in 200756 concerning the impact of EU law on national 
labour law, the question about the compatibility of social rights with the EU economic 
constitution became even more pressing. As the ECJ ruled in favour of economic rights, there 
was a widespread perception that the EU economic constitution is threatening social policy by 
favouring economic integration.  
 
But if the EU constitution systematically biases policy making in the neo liberal direction, 
then the role of the Left in creating such order has to be critically examined as well. Any 
reflection on the nature of the European Union thus has to be also a critical reflection on the 
identity and ideology of the European Left. Namely, as I argued above, the European Left 
supported both the creation of a single market and of the EMU, which were crucial changes to 
the original Rome Treaty.   
 
From this perspective, it is interesting to examine how the European Left responded to the 
described erosion of social rights under the EU economic constitution. In the late 1990s, when 
13 out of 15 member states were ruled by social democrats, the European Left enjoyed a 
unique period of strong social democratic hegemony in the EU politics.57 As we will see, 
social democrats failed to use this unique historic period to lock in a social democratic 
perspective into the EU constitutional order. Although often described as a modest Treaty, the 
Treaty of Amsterdam nonetheless represented a unique opportunity for the Left to 
constitutionalize their social democratic agenda and thus re-balance the dominant neoliberal 
thrust  of the previous two Treaty changes.  
 
However, at the meeting of socialist leaders in Malmö, shortly before the Amsterdam 
Council, it became clear that the diversity of views within the European Left was so big that it 
                                                 
55 Services Directive, 2006. DIRECTIVE 2006/123/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND 
OF THE COUNCIL of 12 December 2006 on services in the internal market, OJ 2006), L376/26. 
56 ECJ, Case C‐438/05, International Transport Workers’ Federation, Finnish Seamen’s Union v. 
Viking Line ABP, OÜ VikingLine Eesti, ECR 2007, I‐10779; ECJ, Case C‐341/05, Laval un Partneri 
Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetareförbundet, ECR 2007, I‐11767; ECJ, Case C‐346/06, Rechtsanwalt 
Dr. Dirk Rüffert v. Land Niedersachsen, ECR 2008, I‐01989. 
57 As Streeck explains, the first attempt to create a comprehensive social policy at European level 
happened in the early 1970s and was largely driven by social.democratic governments to be in power 
in the key countries at that time. However,  the Social Action Programme of 1972 was easily defeated 
by a  British led coalition between neoliberals and nationalist resistance to harmonization. See Streeck, 
note 47 supra, 158. 
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prevented a concerted Left approach in the negotiations leading to Amsterdam Treaty.58 
While the newly elected French prime minister Jospin attacked the neoliberal and monetarist 
thrust of European integration and demanded a social democratization of the EMU, the British 
Prime minister Blair presented his own, a 'third way' version of European social democracy 
strongly opposed to any idea of binding regulation and intervention in employment policy at 
the European level.59 By introducing and expanding the EU competences in employment, 
social policy, equal opportunities, environmental protection, consumer protection and human 
rights, the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) was definitely 'an outlier' in comparison with other 
Treaties, focusing more exclusively on neo-liberal agenda of creation of a unified single 
market. But on the other hand, it felt short of constitutionalizing an alternative social 
democratic EU agenda. Although the new Employment Chapter and a modernized Social 
Chapter represented important change of the EU economic constitution, formally making a 
high level of employment an EU constitutional objective, Blair together with Kohl blocked 
any attempt to grant the EU any significant or regulatory powers in this area.60 Instead, the 
Treaty accepted Blair's version of 'voluntaristic' approach relying entirely on coordination and 
monitoring of national employment policies.  The Left has thus has failed to use a rare 
instance of its political hegemony to more radically change the neoliberal bias of the EU 
constitution.  
 
A similar story happened during the debates of the Convention on the Future of Europe, a 
precursor to future Lisbon Treaty.  An important part of the Left again pressed for a 
constitutionalization of 'social Europe', based on truly federalized social policy and extension 
of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council, but it was again blocked by a coalition of 
the right parties which were joined by the Nordic Social Democrats and Blair's Labour Party 
fearing that any extension of EU competencies might undermine their national welfare 
models. 61 As Ross argues, this can be explained by an established Euro sceptical tradition of 
many deeply social democratic lefts in Europe (Sweden, Denmark, Austria) strongly 
favouring protection of their own domestic welfare models.62 
 
What these examples clearly show is that while the European Left was definitely constrained 
by the asymmetric logic of the institutional order, which by the way the Left also helped to 
construct, there were other issues which equally if not more importantly than the legal 
structure contributed to the absence of a well-defined, concerted Left approach to European 
integration: 
 
                                                 
58 Pollack, note 17 supra, 283. 
59 ibid, 284. 
60 ibid, 285. 
61 D. McCann, D, The Political Economy of the European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective 
(Polity Press, 2010), at 137. 
62 Ross, note 13 supra, 334. 
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Irrespective of the limits imposed by EU institutions on the left's influence, to have 
influence European lefts need to agree on what they want to do together. Here is where 
the largest problems for center-lefts arise.63   
 
It is only the diversity of views within the European Left that inhibits a creation of common 
EU agenda.  The fact that European social democrats did not have a common programme for 
economic regulation at the EU level is also explained by the 'fundamental failure of 
imagination'.64 For the most part of the brief history of European integration, the European 
Left remained imprisoned within the nation state logic of progressive social policy. The 
European Left never really developed a post-national, EU approach to social policy. It usually 
oscillated between the defensive approach of protecting domestic welfare states and by and 
large unsuccessful approach to extend the national model to the EU level.  Although these two 
approaches are quite different, they share one important thing: both use a nation state model 
of social policy as their preferred template for EU policy.  This predicament of the European 
Left is best explained by Amato, a former Italian prime minister and an academic: 
 
In the long history of social rights the workers and their organisations have been the 
promoters of their own progress and the more they have succeeded the more they have 
gained instruments for not just being promoters, but also co-decision makers of the steps 
forward. They are historically used to playing this role at the national level. For the 
future they have to get accustomed to play it more and more at the European one.65    
 
It is surprising how few ideas about alternative 'possible Europes' are being put forward. It 
seems that one of the major problems of the European Left is the lack of institutional 
imagination and programmatic thinking which could offer new ideas about alternative, 
possible Europes. The European Left must start to think how to transcend the 'false necessity' 
of European neoliberal constitutional order. In order to do that, it must also transcend the 
nation state approach to social Europe, which unnecessarily limits the range of options 
available to the European Left to basically two main possibilities: either to a defensive 
strategy of the re-nationalization of social policy, or to a traditional social-democratic attempt 
to reconstruct a Keynesian welfare state on the EU level.  As Ferrera argues, there is a third 
option, promising to reconcile the social model centred on the welfare state with the political 
model centred on the EU model of multi-level governance.  The novelty of this approach is in 
its attempt to strengthen the national welfare state by its more effective and explicit 'nesting' 
within the overall institutional framework of the EU.66  
 
As the EU faces its most severe political and economic crisis since its formation, it becomes 
even clearer that the European left needs to rethink its approach to economic and social 
                                                 
63 ibid, 332-333.  
64 C.S. Allen, 'Social Democracy, Globalization and Governance: Why is there no European Left 
Program in the EU?', Paper presented at the Minda de Gunzburg Center for European Studies, Harvard 
University, April 3, 2000.  
65 G.Amato, 'Making Social Europe European', (2008) 4 Social Europe 31. 
66 M. Ferrera, 'The JCMS Annual Lecture: National Welfare States and European Integration: In 
Search of a “Virtuous Nesting', (2009) 47 Journal of Common Market Studies 220. 
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regulation at the EU level.  With several Treaty amendments and other 'turbo-speed' 
legislative activities aimed to solve the euro-zone debt crisis, the Right Centre coalition under 
a strong hegemony of the German Chancellor Merkel has fundamentally transformed the 
economic constitution .67  With adoption of the Fiscal Treaty, ESM, European Semester, Euro 
Plus Pact, Six Pack, this time, the EU risks undermining the 'substantive balance' between the 
market integration and social policy that sustains the legitimacy of the integration project.68   
 
While previous Treaty amendments tilted the EU economic constitution strongly into the neo-
liberal direction, they nonetheless included legal provisions protecting redistributive 
autonomy of member states at the national level. This time,  the 'Union has been transformed 
into a political system redistributing significant wealth within its territory'.69 For the first time 
in the EU history we see an emergence of a new economic constitution which explicitly 
entrenches one economic paradigm at the expense of other alternatives, with simultaneously 
dismantling the remaining protections of social policy autonomy of member states. This 
approach is not only constitutionally problematic, but also economically questionable.70 It 
threatens the very existence of the EU as we have known it. As Schmidt argues, at the 
moment only a renewed social democratic agenda can help to solve this problem.71       
 
V. Toward European Austerity Union: EU Constitution after the Euro crisis 
 
Confronted with the deepest economic and political crisis of the EU since its inception, 
European political leaders responded with a series of legislative measures aimed primarily to 
solve the euro-zone debt crisis. In the last two years, they adopted European Semester (2010), 
European Financial Stability Facility (2010), Euro-Plus Pact (2011), Six-Pack (2011), 
European Stability Mechanism (2012) and Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination and Governance 
in the Economic and Monetary Union (a.k.a. the Fiscal Treaty, 2012).  The economic theory 
behind all these rules is that a profligacy of 'irresponsible' states and their public sectors is the 
main reason for the current euro crisis.  Hence, the best approach to solve the crisis is to 
impose strict new rules which aim to discipline such 'irresponsible' countries. In other words, 
the imposition of strict austerity through balanced budgets and stricter fiscal rules became a 
new dominant economic ideology of the EU current leadership lead by Merkel and Sarkozy.  
 
                                                 
67 C. Joerges, 'The European Economic Constitution and Its Transformation Through the Financial 
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70 L.King, M. Kitson, S. Konzelmann, F. Wilkinson,  'Making the same mistake again- or is this time 
different?', (2012) 36 Cambridge Journal of Economics 6. 
71 V. Schmidt, 'The Unfinished Architecture of Europe's Economic Union', (2010) 23 Governance 
555-559. 
16 
 
Despite the fact that the austerity approach rests on a wrong diagnosis of the euro crisis72, that 
it does not work economically and that it has strong negative economic and social 
consequences for indebted countries, it still remains virtually unchallenged 'official' economic 
doctrine of the current EU leadership. However, the elections in France in May 2012 brought 
to power a new Socialist president Hollande, one of the most vocal critics of the austerity in 
Europe.  With the euro zone debt crisis further deteriorating, other important institutions such 
as IMF and the US Treasury also voiced a strong criticism of the austerity orthodoxy and 
urged for a new pro-growth approach. As a consequence, during the June 2012 Euro Area 
Summit the debate shifted from austerity to growth and several EU leaders urged for a new 
growth pact to complement the Fiscal Treaty. However, while making certain important 
concession to the pro-growth advocates (Hollande and Monti)73, the conclusions of the 
Summit felt short of producing a more ambitious alternative to Merkel’s austerity policy. 
 
The politics of strict austerity has profound constitutional implications for the EU legal order. 
It represents nothing less than a fundamental transformation of the economic constitution.74  
For the first time the substantive balance of the EU ensuring 'the relative neutrality'75 of the 
Union’s policies has been explicitly disregarded.    
 
The Fiscal Treaty76, for example, basically entrenches a certain economic theory at the level 
of constitutional law requiring the signatories of the Treaty to change their constitutions, 
preferably, with new provisions of binding force and permanent character.77 In other words, 
the signatories of the compact are asked to introduce into their constitutions provisions which 
can’t be changed through regular amendment procedures.  As a consequence, the austerity 
policy of Angela Merkel thus achieves binding and eternal legal validity. While it elevates the 
austerity paradigm of the German Chancellor Angela Merkel to the status of 'unbreakable 
law', it basically outlaws Keynesianism and its counter-cyclical economic policies. No 
surprise then that in the editorial, one of the leading constitutional journals in Europe 
concludes that the Fiscal compact 'strikes at the heart of the institutions of parliamentary 
                                                 
72 A. Moravcsik, 'Europe After the Crisis: How to Sustain a Common Currency', (2012) 91 Foreign 
Affairs 57. 
73 The Summit conclusions contain also an annex entitled «A Compact for Growth and Jobs«, 
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74 Joerges, note 63 supra. 
75 Dawson, de Witte, note 64  supra. 
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democracy by dislocating as a matter of constitutional principle the budgetary autonomy of 
the member states'.78 In addition, the European Court of Justice was given new powers to 
determine whether the member states comply with their duty to introduce balanced budget 
rules into their constitutional legal order. Such new power represents unprecedented 
constitutional intrusion, since the European Court of Justice never had the power to interpret 
national constitutions of the member states.  
 
Other measures such as The Euro- Plus Pact and The European Growth Pact on the other hand 
explicitly suggest coordination and harmonization of such contentious welfare issues as 
pension schemes, social benefits and employment policies.  Access to bail out funds, provided 
by EFSM and EFSF, requires prior ratification of the Fiscal Treaty and signing a 
Memorandum of Understanding which requires very specific and detailed reforms.   Financial 
aid to Greece and Portugal is conditional on VAT increases, pension cuts, and the 
liberalization of public services.79 The latest example of this new forms of austerity 
constitutionalism are 'Contracts for Competitiveness and Growth', proposed by the EU 
Commission. The main idea behind the Contracts is that the governments in trouble would get 
the EU financial support with temporary conditional transfers based upon previous agreement 
with the EU on the content of a policy agenda.80     
 
Another important feature of these new instruments is that they side-line national parliaments 
and empower technocrats and judges to decide whether the member states fiscal policies are 
in compliance with the EU rules.  Once a country is found in breach of these fiscal 
obligations, the Commission, the Council, and the ECJ have extensive powers of control and 
sanction over a member state fiscal policy. As argued by a prominent economist, 'the 
profoundly undemocratic nature this approach is clear- the unelected European Commission 
can “request” that the elected national parliament and government to change its budget'.81   
 
The new Austerity Union thus undermines the most fundamental principles of 'substantive 
balance' in the EU constitutional order.  These principles, enshrined in the original Rome 
Treaty, provided a workable balance between Union’s economic goals and national 
redistributive social policies. As I argue in Section 3, this balance has already been redefined 
in the 1980s with the single market project and monetary union.  Nonetheless, the economic 
constitution of the Union has never so directly affected the member states’ autonomy in its 
redistributive policies as it does with the newly adopted constitutional components of the 
emerging Austerity Union.82 
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In their critical assessment of this new model for the EU, Leonard and Zielonka argue that 
Europe needs a different model of integration to survive: 
 
To survive the crisis, European leaders should embrace pluralism, participation and 
solidarity rather than the technocratic centralism of rules and sanctions.83 
 
As Schmidt argues, it is quite clear that impetus for such a new approach will not come from 
the austerity camp.84 German Chancellor Merkel, Barroso and Van Rompuy, supported by a 
group of Northern countries, remain firmly devoted to their austerity approach. European left, 
on the other side, is politically weak and curiously absent from political debate on the euro 
zone crisis. Brown, Halpin and Texeira describe this situation as the 'European paradox', 
where paradox refers to the failure of the European left to capitalize on the strong association 
between conservative reverence for the unfettered market and the current economic crisis.85  
As I tried to argue in this article, such a failure cannot be attributed solely to the constitutional 
structure of the Union.  The Left needs to offer a new approach to the EU economic and social 
policy making which transcends the limits of the nation state model.   
 
Current EU crisis is thus both challenge and opportunity for the European Left.  By reforming 
itself, the Left could also offer a new vision for Europe.   How well is the European Left 
prepared for such an occasion?  Despite the fact that all key positions in the EU are 
momentarily in the Centre-Right hands, there are some promising news. If there were 
elections tomorrow, the Centre-Left would for the first time win a majority in the European 
Parliament (Hix, Marsh, Predict09, 2012).86 The Party of European Socialists (PES), a 
coalition of the socialist, social-democratic and labour parties of the EU, came out with a new 
Socialist Manifesto 'For a European Socialist Alternative' (PES, 2012).87  By and large a 
response to the Merkel’s politics of austerity, Manifesto offers some proposals which signal a 
departure from the traditional Left EU strategy.  Several proposals from the Manifesto 
advocate a constitutional re-orientation of the EU, but, curiously, not towards a federalized 
welfare state. Although the Manifesto falls short of proposing needed radical institutional 
innovation, it contains certain elements that point in that direction. For example,  they propose 
'an economic policy for the Union which places the economic and social objectives laid down 
in the Treaty (growth, full employment, social inclusion), at the heart of policy-making with 
just as much vigour and organisational firepower as that accorded to the objective of 
budgetary discipline'.88  Interestingly, the means to achieve this end (budget reform, European 
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Project Bonds, promotion of social, infrastructure and sustainable development investment),  
offer a new approach to 'social Europe' where the proposed European economic and social 
policy seeks rather to strengthen than displace various national models of welfares states and 
varieties of capitalism.  Nevertheless, in order to make the Manifesto a new platform for a 
common EU strategy, the Left need to avoid some of the past mistakes.  Only a concerted, 
European response of the European Lefts offers a hope that they could reverse the course of 
European history and make the EU again, as it was in its early days, both the protector and 
promoter of European nation states.89   
 
 
VI. Conclusion: Constitutional limits to Progressive Politics? 
 
Constitutions in politically liberal nation states usually don't discriminate among different 
political ideologies.90 While constitutions impose certain limits on legislative politics, 
primarily through the protection of constitutional rights, it can hardly be argued that, on 
balance, they privilege one or another political ideology. The EU 'economic constitution' is, in 
this respect, different. It systematically biases EU policy making in a neo-liberal direction.  
Historically speaking, this was not the intent of the EU founding fathers.  The original 
constitutional settlement of embedded liberalism was significantly redefined in the next major 
revisions of the Rome Treaty.  The neo-liberal foundations of the single market and the EMU 
have imposed real and significant institutional constraints for progressive policy making.  
However, the role of the European Left was crucial in this alteration of the EU constitutional 
order. Despite the strong neoliberal consensus among the key political actors of that time, 
such a change would have not be possible without the Left' retreat towards 'centre-leftism', 
particularly in France.  Furthermore, while constrains of the EU economic constitution are 
significant, we should avoid the 'naturalization' of the EU, 'depicting it as an automatic upshot 
of a wholly impersonal logic'.91 As Rosemond argues, such view downplays the contingency 
of such logic .92 The European Left, while in power, failed to leave its distinct imprint on the 
EU economic constitution.  Despite certain quite important achievements (Employment 
Chapter, Social Chapter, equal protection, environment, health and safety), the Left failed to 
promote a coherent EU approach to 'social Europe'. The Left policy agenda remained firmly 
embedded in the logic of the nation state.  The euro crisis pushed these developments even 
further and, for the first time in the EU history, explicitly challenged the constitutional balance 
of the EU legal order.  The new Austerity Union, a project in the making, profoundly altered 
this constitutional balance.  The new politics of austerity is both politically and economically 
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flawed. It threatens the very foundations of European integration. The euro crisis thus 
represents both a challenge and opportunity for the Left to offer an alternative response to the 
biggest EU crisis since its inception. But in order to succeed, the European Left must first 
reform itself.  The PES Manifesto is a promising sign in that direction.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
